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Abstract Decision making requires integrating knowledge gathered from personal experiences
with advice from others. The neural underpinnings of the process of arbitrating between
information sources has not been fully elucidated. In this study, we formalized arbitration as the
relative precision of predictions, afforded by each learning system, using hierarchical Bayesian
modeling. In a probabilistic learning task, participants predicted the outcome of a lottery using
recommendations from a more informed advisor and/or self-sampled outcomes. Decision
confidence, as measured by the number of points participants wagered on their predictions, varied
with our definition of arbitration as a ratio of precisions. Functional neuroimaging demonstrated
that arbitration signals were independent of decision confidence and involved modality-specific
brain regions. Arbitrating in favor of self-gathered information activated the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex and the midbrain, whereas arbitrating in favor of social information engaged the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala. These findings indicate that relative precision
captures arbitration between social and individual learning systems at both behavioral and neural
levels.
Introduction
As social primates navigating an uncertain world, humans use multiple information sources to guide
their decisions (Charness et al., 2013). For example, in investment decisions, investors may either
choose to follow a financial expert’s advice about a particular stock or base their decision on their
own previous experience with that stock. When information from personal experience and social
advice conflict, one source must be favored over the other to guide decision making. We conceptu-
alize the process of selecting between information sources as arbitration. Arbitration is particularly
important in uncertain situations when different sources of information have different
levels of reliability. While stock performance may fluctuate, the advisor could pursue selfish
interests. In our example, investors may track stock performance as it fluctuates and also scrutinize a
financial expert’s recommendation. Such advice may change based on the advisor’s current knowl-
edge and underlying personal incentives. Thus, it is challenging to infer the intentions of the advisor
because they are concealed or expressed indirectly, requiring inference from observations of
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ambiguous behavior. Optimal arbitration should therefore consider the relative uncertainty associ-
ated with each source of information.
Arbitrating between different types of reward predictions based on experiential learning acquired
by an individual has been associated with the prefrontal cortex. Specifically, the dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex (DLPFC) and the frontopolar cortex have been shown to arbitrate between habitual
(model-free) and planned (model-based) learning systems (Lee et al., 2014). By contrast, compara-
tively little is known about how humans weigh self-gathered (individual) reward information against
observed (social) information. To investigate this question, we considered two hypotheses: First,
arbitration involving social information could rely on theory of mind (ToM) processes, that is infer-
ence about others’ mental states (Frith and Frith, 2005; Schaafsma et al., 2015) and higher-level
social representations (Frith, 2012; Devaine et al., 2014a). Accordingly, arbitration involving the
intentions of others may rely on activity in classical ToM regions, such as the temporoparietal junc-
tion (TPJ) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (Carrington and Bailey, 2009; Frith and Frith, 2010;
Baker, 2011; Schurz et al., 2014). Alternatively, arbitrating between individual and social informa-
tion may involve similar neural networks as those selecting between model-free and model-based
learning (Lee et al., 2014), and thus engage lateral prefrontal and frontopolar regions.
It is also worth noting that arbitration depends on both experienced and inferred value learning.
Similarly to directly experienced reward learning, inferring on others’ intentions engages the stria-
tum, potentially signaling the value associated with social feedback during probabilistic reward
learning tasks. For example, parts of the striatum including the caudate show stronger activations in
response to reciprocated compared to unreciprocated cooperation during iterative trust games
(Delgado et al., 2005; King-Casas et al., 2008; Fareri et al., 2015), and represent social prediction
errors signaling a change in fidelity (Delgado et al., 2005; Biele et al., 2009; Klucharev et al.,
2009; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Braams et al., 2014; Diaconescu et al., 2017).
In addition, with respect to tracking higher level, contextual change about both reward contin-
gencies and intentionality, one may expect the involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
In addition to being associated with volatility tracking in a probabilistic reward learning task
(Behrens et al., 2007), the ACC was shown to represent volatility precision-weighted
prediction errors (PEs) during social learning (Diaconescu et al., 2017).
An additional intriguing question is which neuromodulatory system supports the arbitration pro-
cess. Since arbitration is dependent on the uncertainty of predictions afforded by each learning sys-
tem, several neuromodulatory systems are good candidates. For non-social forms of learning,
previous studies have implicated dopaminergic, cholinergic, and noradrenergic systems in signaling
uncertainty, defined as the inverse of precision (Yu and Dayan, 2005; Iglesias et al., 2013; Payzan-
LeNestour et al., 2013; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015; Marshall et al., 2016). Here, we examined
how arbitration uniquely modulates activity across dopaminergic, cholinergic, and noradrenergic
neuromodulatory systems.
To investigate arbitration between individual and social learning systems, we simulated the afore-
mentioned stock investment scenario in the laboratory. Specifically, we examined how people arbi-
trate between individual reward information and social advice about a probabilistic lottery where
contingencies changed over time. Participants learned to predict the outcome of a binary card draw
using advice from a more informed advisor and information inferred from individually observed card
outcomes (Figure 1).
We separately manipulated the degree of uncertainty (or its inverse, precision) associated with
each information source by independently varying the rate of change with which each information
source predicted the drawn card color (i.e. volatility; Behrens et al., 2007). The advisor was moti-
vated to give correct or incorrect advice depending on the phase of the task, resulting variable reli-
ability of social information. Performing well in the task therefore required participants to track the
probabilities of the two sources of information and decide which of the two to trust. We assumed
that participants weighed the predictions afforded by each information source as a function of their
precision. Thus, we expected participants to rely more on the advice when the advisor’s intentions
were perceived as stable, and on their personal experience when the intentions of the advisor were
perceived to be volatile.
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Results
To examine the neural mechanisms underlying arbitration, we recruited 48 volunteers (mean age
23.6 ± 1.4, 32 females) to perform a binary lottery task requiring arbitration between individual expe-
rienced card outcomes and expert advice. We combined fMRI with a computational modeling
approach using the hierarchical Gaussian filter (HGF) (Mathys et al., 2011; Mathys et al., 2014).
This hierarchical Bayesian model is ideally suited to address our question as it examines multilevel
inference and provides trial-wise estimates of estimated precision of predictions about each informa-
tion source. This framework operationalizes arbitration as a precision ratio, corresponding to the rel-
ative perceived precision of each information source (Figure 2). Thus, arbitration changes as a
function of the relative stability of the advice or the card color probabilities. In our paradigm, arbitra-
tion increased when the precision of the predictions about one of the two sources of information
was high and decreased when both sources were either stable or volatile (see Figure 4 for the arbi-
tration signal averaged across participants).
Behavior: accuracy of lottery outcome prediction and wager amount
Using the factorial structure of the task, we tested the impact of volatility on performance with a
two-factor repeated measures ANOVA, where the two factors were information source (card versus
advice) and phase (stable versus volatile). Across all behavioral metrics, we observed an effect of
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm. (a) Binary lottery game requiring arbitration between individual experience and social information. Volunteers
predicted the outcome of a binary lottery, that is whether a blue or green card would be drawn. They could base predictions on two sources of
information: advice from a gender-matched advisor (video, presented for 2 s) who was better informed about the color of the drawn card, and on an
estimate about the statistical likelihood of the cards being one or the other color that the participant had to infer from own experience (outcome, 1 s).
After predicting the color of the rewarded lottery card (user-controlled, maximum 3 s), participants also wagered one to ten points (user-controlled,
maximum 6 s), which they would win or lose depending on whether the prediction was right or wrong. After the outcome, participants viewed their
cumulative score on the feedback screen (1 s). (b) Contingencies of individual reward and social advice information: Card color probability corresponds
to the likelihood of a given color (e.g. blue) being rewarded. The probabilities were matched on average for the two information sources (55% for the
card color information and 56% for the advice information). Additionally, the two sources of information were uncorrelated as illustrated by phases of
low (yellow) and high (light grey) volatility, enabling a factorial analysis of information source and volatility.
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 1:
Figure supplement 1. Behavior influenced by volatility.
Figure supplement 2. |Average pairwise correlations between regressors.
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phase, indicating a reduction in performance in volatile compared to stable phases, and a phase 
information interaction, indicating that the effect was larger for the social than the individual source
of information. First, for the accuracy with which participants predicted lottery outcome, we found a
main effect of phase (df = (1,36), F = 187.94, p = 7.7e-16) and an information source-by-phase inter-
action (df = (1,36), F = 11.13, p = 0.0020) (see Figure 1—figure supplement 1a). Thus, in-keeping
with the rationale that arbitration relates to relative information quality, the degree to which partici-
pants relied on each information source was a function of precision as manipulated using the volatil-
ity structure of the task. Participants performed significantly better in stable compared to volatile
periods of the task. These effects were not modulated by fatigue, as we found no significant differ-
ences between early and late phases of the task.
Second, advice-taking behavior differed as a function of volatility and information source: For the
percentage of trials in which participants followed a given source of information, we detected a
main effect of phase (df = (1,36), F = 56.26, p=7.3073e-09) and an information source-by-phase
Figure 2. Computational learning and arbitration model. In this graphical notation, circles represent constants whereas hexagons and diamonds
represent quantities that change in time (i.e. that carry a time/trial index). Hexagons in contrast to diamonds additionally depend on the previous state
in time in a Markovian fashion. The two-branch HGF describes the generative model for advice and card probability: x1 represents the accuracy of the
current advice/card color probability, x2 the tendency of the advisor to offer helpful advice tendency of card color to be rewarded, and x3 the current
volatility of the advisor’s intentions/card color probabilities. Learning parameters describe how the states evolve in time. Parameter k determines how
strongly x2 and x3 are coupled, and # represents the meta-volatility of x3. The response model maps the predicted color probabilities to choices. The
response model also assumes that trial-wise wagers and predictions arise from a linear combination of arbitration, informational uncertainty (advice and
card), and volatility (advice and card). For model selection, we combined three perception with three response models (see Figure 3). All the models
considered can be grouped according to common features and divided into model families: (i) the Perceptual model families distinguish between more
(non-normative and normative three-level) and less (two-level) complex types of HGFs. More specifically, the distinction between three-level and two-
level HGFs refers to estimating or fixing the volatility of the third level; normative in contrast to non-normative HGFs assume optimal Bayesian
inference. (ii) Response model families distinguish between arbitrated and single-information source – advice or card only – models, which correspond
to estimating parameter # or fixing it to reduce arbitration to either the advice prediction or the card color prediction.
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 2:
Figure supplement 1. Parameter recovery when using empirical parameter values (Binary HGF).
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interaction (df = (1,36), F = 25.86, p=1.1561e-05) (Figure 1—figure supplement 1b). Thus, partici-
pants took advice less often particularly when it was volatile rather than stable.
Third, the amount of points wagered also depended on the task volatility and the information
source. We observed a main effect of phase (df = (1,36), F = 28.78, p = 4.54e-06) and an information
source-by-phase interaction (df = (1,36), F = 16.75, p = 2.21e-04; Figure 1—figure supplement 1c).
Participants wagered fewer points particularly when advice was volatile. Moreover, the number of
points wagered correlated significantly with the total score in stable phases (r = 0.37, p = 0.02), but
not in volatile phases (r = 0.30, p = 0.06). Simulations using a two-level HGF (with low and fixed vol-
atility) suggested that tracking volatility is beneficial for task performance: a hypothetical person
who did not take the volatility of the task phases into account gained on average 21.6 points less
than an agent tracking volatility. In line with previous evidence (Behrens et al., 2008), these results
emphasize the impact of volatility on the willingness to invest and investment success as measured
here by total score.
Advisor ratings
Participants were asked to rate the advisor (i.e. helpful, misleading, or neutral with regard to sug-
gesting the correct outcome) in a multiple-choice question presented five times during the experi-
ment. The time points were associated with different social and individual information (initial/prior:
1st trial; stable advice, stable card phase = (14th trial); stable advice, volatile card phase (49th trial);
volatile advice, volatile card phase (73rd trial); volatile advice, stable card phase = 115th trial). On
average, participants rated the advice as 75.0 ± 4.6% (mean ± standard deviation) helpful in the sta-
ble advice phase. The corresponding values were 50 ± 3.4% in the volatile advice phase, 63.8 ± 4.4%
in the stable card phase, and 61.2 ± 3.8% in the volatile card phase.
We examined the extent to which participants’ ratings changed as a function of the task phases,
and found a significant main effect of phase (df = (1,36), F = 15.67, p = 3.3e-04) and a significant
information source  phase interaction (df = (1,36), F = 8.42, p = 0.0062). This suggests that advice
ratings decreased during volatile compared to stable phases, and this effect was more strongly
related to the advice compared to the card information.
Debriefing questionnaire
After completing the task, participants filled out a task-specific debriefing questionnaire, assessing
their perception of the advisor and how they integrated the social information during the task. The
questions were originally presented to participants in their native German, and are translated here
into English.
First, participants were asked to describe the strategy the advisor used in the game (debriefing
question 3: ‘Did the advisor intentionally use a strategy during the task? If yes, describe what strat-
egy that was’). Thirty out of 38 participants answered ‘Yes’ to this question, and described (in their
own words) the advisor’s strategy. We repeated our analyses including only these 30 participants
and found that all conclusions remained statistically the same. Second, participants were asked to
rate the advice on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from unhelpful to very helpful (debriefing question
4: ‘How helpful did you perceive the advice you received?”). In general, participants rated the advi-
sors’ recommendations as helpful (mean ratings 4.2 ± 1.0, ranging from 2 to 6). Finally, we also
asked participants to rate, in terms of percentages, how often they followed the advice (debriefing
question 5: ‘How often did you follow the recommendations of the advisor?”). On average, partici-
pants reported that they followed the advice 60% of the time (mean ratings 60 ± 12), which signifi-
cantly differed from chance (t(37) = 5.02, p=1.29e-05). Thus, participants experienced advisors as
intentional and helpful, which are core characteristics of social agents.
Model-based results
We used computational modeling with hierarchical Gaussian Filters (HGF; Figure 2) to explain partic-
ipants’ responses on every trial. To contrast competing mechanisms underlying learning and arbitra-
tion, our model space included a total of nine models (Figure 3a). Non-normative perceptual
models varied in complexity of volatility processing (three-level full HGF vs. two-level no-volatility
HGF), normative perceptual models assumed optimal Bayesian inference (normative HGF), and
response models varied in the extent of arbitration (arbitration; no arbitration: advice only; no
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arbitration: card information only). Bayesian model selection (Stephan et al., 2009) served to com-
pare models (see Materials and methods and Figure 2 for details). For model comparison, we used
the log model evidence (LME), which represents a trade-off between model complexity and model
fit.
Do participants arbitrate between advice and individually sampled card
outcomes?
The winning model was the three-level HGF with arbitration (fp = 0.999; Bayes Omnibus Risk =
4.26e-11; Figure 3b; Table 1a). This model formalised arbitration as a ratio of precisions: the preci-
sion of the prediction about advice accuracy and color probability, divided by total precision. More-
over, the model included a social bias parameter reflecting the degree to which participants
followed the advisor irrespective of task information. The model family that included volatility of
both information sources outperformed models without volatility, in-keeping with the model-inde-
pendent finding that perceived volatility of both information sources affected behavior.
Is the parameter estimation robust?
The winning three-level full HGF model includes multiple parameters that need to be estimated. A
general question is whether these parameters are ‘practically identifiable’, that is whether their val-
ues can be recovered accurately given the actual experimental design. To examine this question, we
simulated responses based on all participants’ maximum-a-posteriori estimates of the parameters,
and then fitted the model to those simulated responses in order to test whether we could recover
the same parameter estimates.
Figure 3. Hierarchical structure of the model space and model selection results. (a) The learning and arbitration models considered in this study have a
3  3 factorial structure and can be displayed as a tree. The nodes at the top level represent the perceptual model families (three-level HGF, normative
HGF, two-level non-volatility HGF). The leaves at the bottom represent response models which integrate and arbitrate between social and individual
sources of information (‘Arbitrated’) or exclusively consider social (‘Advice’) or individual (‘Card’) information. (b) Random effects Bayesian model
selection revealed one winning model, the Arbitrated three-level HGF. Posterior model probabilities or p mjyð Þ indicated that this model best explained
participants’ behavior in the majority of the cases.
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To assess and compare degrees of parameter recovery, we categorized it in terms of effect sizes,
that is, whether the relationship between the original and the recovered values indicates small,
medium, or large effect sizes as quantified by Cohen’s f . For a multiple regression analysis, a
Cohen’s f above 0.4 is conventionally regarded as a large effect size. Based on this criterion, we
could recover all parameters well, as all Cohen’s f values equaled or exceeded 0.4 (see Figure 2—
figure supplement 1).
Do participants differ in how they learn from advice and use it to
predict lottery outcomes?
Three parameters modulated the arbitration signal of the winning model. These included: (i) k or the
coupling between the two hierarchical levels that determined the impact of volatility on the inferred
predictions of each information source (Equation 6), (ii) #, determining the variance of the volatility
(Equation 12), and (iii) z, the social bias which reflected the reliance on the advice independent of
its reliability (Equation 19). Both coupling k and volatility parameter # did not differ significantly
Table 1. (a) Results of Bayesian model selection: Model probability (p mjyð Þ) and protected
exceedance probabilities (fp).
Please refer to the participants’ LME and BMS results in Table 1—source datas 1 and
2, respectively. (b) Average maximum a-posteriori estimates of the learning and arbitration parame-
ters of the winning model (Arbitrated three-level HGF). Please refer to participants’ individual poste-
rior parameter estimates for perceptual and response model parameters in Table 1—source datas 3
and 4.
Perceptual Models:
Response models: Arbitrated Advice Only Card Only
3-level HGF
p mjyð Þ 0.63 0.04 0.02
fp 0.99 4.7e-12 4.7e-12
Normative HGF
p mjyð Þ 0.03 0.03 0.02
fp 4.7e-12 4.7e-12 4.7e-12
2-level HGF
p mjyð Þ 0.15 0.06 0.02





kc 0.58 0.17 z 1.03 1.24
ka 0.56 0.28 b1  1.59 0.94
#c 0.59 0.07 b2 1.42 1.69





The online version of this article includes the following source data for Table 1:
Source data 1. Log model evidences for all models.
Source data 2. Random effects Bayesian model selection.
Source data 3. Maximum a posteriori estimates of the perceptual model parameters and response model
parameters influencing choice along with subject IDs.
Source data 4. Maximum a posteriori estimates of the response model parameters influencing wagers along with
subject IDs.
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between learning from individual and social information (t(36) = 0.28, p=0.77 for k and t(36) = -1.59,
p=0.12 for #; Figure 4a-b). In fact, they were highly correlated: r1=0.55, p1=0.003 for k and r2=0.64,
p2=0.001 for #. This result suggests that participants learned similarly from individual (volatile card
probabilities) and social (advisor fidelity) information.
The reliability-independent social bias parameter z differed significantly from zero (t(36) = 5.09,
p=1.07e-05). Importantly, since the social bias parameter z is coded in log-space, the prior value of
zero refers to a uniform weighting of the two cues in linear parameter space. Thus, on average, par-
ticipants relied more on the advisor’s recommendations compared to their own sampling of the card
outcomes (Figure 4c).
Do the response model parameter estimates explain wager behavior?
Decisions of how many points participants were willing to wager on a given trial (a measure of confi-
dence) were related to several model-based quantities, including (irreducible) uncertainty of the
agent’s beliefs about the decision, arbitration, and the estimated volatility of the advisor’s intentions
(belief uncertainty: t(37) = -10.37, pbonf = 1.0e-11; arbitration: t(37)=5.16, pbonf = 5e-05; and esti-
mated advisor volatility: t(37)=-7.41 pbonf = 4.75e-08) (Figure 5). The stronger the bias to arbitrate in
favor of social information, the more points participants wagered. Conversely, estimated advisor vol-
atility was negatively associated with the amount wagered: the higher the estimated advisor volatil-
ity, the fewer points participants were willing to wager on a given trial (see Table 2 for the priors
over the parameters, Table 1b for all parameter estimates, and Figure 5 for the trial-wise influence
of the average computational quantities on wager amount).
Do the model parameter estimates explain perceived advice accuracy
and wager amount?
We aimed to examine at the behavioral level whether the model predictions were consistent with
participants’ perceptions of the advice accuracy during the experiment. Participants judged advice
accuracy (i.e. helpful, misleading, or neutral with regard to predicting actual card color) in a multiple-
choice question presented 5fivetimes during the experiment (initial/prior: 1st trial; stable advice, sta-
ble card phase = (14th trial); stable advice, volatile card phase (49th trial); volatile advice, volatile
card phase (73rd trial); volatile advice, stable card phase = 115th trial). We first tested whether the
responses to these questions positively related to estimates of advice accuracy (
kð Þ
1;aÞ that were
extracted from the winning model. A linear regression analysis demonstrated that the inferred
advice accuracy or 
kð Þ
1;a measured at the time of the multiple-choice question, predicted participants’
selections. Specifically, the estimated beta parameter estimate across all task phases was signifi-
cantly different from zero (t(36) = 4.71, p=3e-05). These findings suggest that the model predicted
independently (and discretely) measured perception of advice accuracy, in-keeping with the internal
validity of the model.
Next, we tested whether the wager amounts predicted by the model correlated with participants’
actual wagers. In all four conditions of the task, the predicted wager significantly correlated with the
number of points participants actually wagered: (i) advice stable phase r1 = 0.62, p1 = 3e-05; (ii)
advice volatile phase r2 = 0.63, p2 = 2e-05; (iii) card stable phase r3 = 0.81, p4 = 9e-10; and (iv) card
volatile phase r4 = 0.80, p4 = 1e-09 (Figure 5—figure supplement 1). These findings suggest that
the winning model explained variation in (the continuously measured) actual wager amount.
Do the model parameter estimates explain participants’ self-reports?
We used classical multiple regression and post-hoc tests to examine whether the model parameter
estimates extracted from the winning model (M1) explained participants’ advisor ratings, as mea-
sured by debriefing questions after the main experiment outside the scanner. Participants who
reported that the advisor intentionally tried to help or mislead at different phases of the task showed
a trend towards a larger estimate of the social weighting parameter z (df = (1,36), F = 3.49, p =
0.06). Moreover, advice helpfulness ratings were explained by model parameter estimates (R2 =
32.2%, F = 2.46, p=0.04). This effect was primarily driven by parameter ka (r(37)=0.47, p=0.0026),
indicating that participants who rated the advice as being helpful showed stronger coupling
between two levels of the hierarchical model. More specifically, participants who rated the advice as
more helpful displayed higher ka values, that is, increased sensitivity to the changing phases of
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Figure 4. Inference and arbitration of individual and social learning. (a) Average trajectories for arbitration and hierarchical precision-weighted PEs for
individual and social learning (see Materials and methods for the exact equations): a = arbitration in favor of the advice (Equation 19); c = arbitration
in favor of individually estimated card color probability (Equation 20). 1;a = estimated advice accuracy (Equation 4); 1;c = individually estimated card
color probability (Equation 18). "2;a = precision-weighted prediction error (PE) of advisor fidelity (Equation 8); "2;c = unsigned (absolute) precision-
weighted PE of card outcome (absolute value of Equation 14). "3;a = precision-weighted advice volatility PE (Equation 13); "3;c = precision-weighted
card color volatility PE (Equation 15). Line plots were generated by averaging the computational trajectories of the winning (Arbitrated 3-HGF:
Figure 2) model across all participants for each of the 160 trials. The shaded area around each line depicts +/- standard error of the mean over
participants. (b) Group means, standard deviations and prior values for the perceptual model parameters determining dynamics of computational
trajectories in (a). Jittered participant-specific estimates are plotted for each perceptual model parameter, red lines indicate the group mean, grey
areas reflect 1 SD of the mean, and colored areas the 95% confidence intervals of the mean. (c) Distribution of log(z) values. In (b) and (c), black
diamonds denote the priors of each parameter (for details, see Table 2).
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advice validity, adjusting their wagering behavior more strongly to the advisor’s strategy. Thus, not
only did the participants perceive the advice in our task as intentional and helpful, our model also
explained some of these impressions.
Neural signatures of arbitration
Using behaviorally fitted computational trajectories to generate participant-specific GLMs for model-
based fMRI analysis, we examined how the brain arbitrates between social and individual learning
systems. We conceptualized the learning and arbitration process as hierarchical Bayesian inference,
and fitted the participant-specific trajectories that reflect arbitration (Equation 20) to fMRI data.
Hierarchical precision-weighted PE signals were replicated in the same dopaminergic and fronto-
parietal regions as in previous studies using other sensory and social learning domains (see
Iglesias et al., 2013; Diaconescu et al., 2017), indicating that the modifications in the experimental
paradigm did not affect basic learning processes (see Figure 6—figure supplements 1–2).
Undirected tests for arbitration activity identified ventral prefrontal regions, such as the left ven-
tromedial PFC (peak at [-2, 46,–10]) and the right orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) [26, 34, -10]. Interest-
ingly, frontal activations also included the right frontopolar cortex [4, 54, 30] and ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) [50, 36, 0], regions previously associated with arbitration between model-
based and model-free forms of individual learning (Lee et al., 2014; Figure 6). The right VLPFC
showing arbitration-related effects at [48, 35, -2] significantly overlapped with the arbitration-related
reliability activations detected by Lee and colleagues, supporting the notion that arbitration is to
some extent domain-independent.
In addition, we found that a wide network of cortical and subcortical regions contributes to arbi-
tration that included occipital areas, the anterior insula, left thalamus, left putamen, bilateral middle
cingulate sulcus, supplementary motor area (SMA) [ 2, -8, 52], left dorsal middle cingulate gyrus
[ 10,–26, 44], the right amygdala [18, -10, -16] and the left midbrain [ 6,–18,  12] (Table 3, Fig-
ure 6). Thus, a network of cortical and subcortical regions contributed to arbitration.
Directed tests for arbitration in favor of individual over social information identified activity
increases in the right dorsolateral PFC [36, 46, 30], left SMA/anterior cingulate sulcus [ 2,–8, 52] and
Table 2. Prior mean and variance of the perceptual and response model parameters.
Model Prior mean Prior variance
Perceptual models:
Three-level HGF ka, kc 0.5 1
#a, #c 0.55 1
Normative HGF ka, kc 0.5 0
#a, #c 0.55 0






1. Arbitrated z 0 25
2. Advice Only z Inf 0
3. Card Only z 0 0




mated in logit-space, while the other parameters are estimated in log-space. Although the prior variances for all
parameters are set to be rather broad, we selected a shrinkage prior mean and variance for the decision noise
parameter bch such that behavior is explained more by variations in the remaining parameters rather than decision
noise.
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Figure 5. Computational quantities and model parameters explaining wager amount. (a) With our response model, we predicted that the actual trial-
wise wager (right) could be explained (left and bottom) by the six key trajectories (see Equation 21) given in (b). These include (i) (irreducible) belief
uncertainty (based on the integrated belief of individual and advice predictions; Equation 24); (ii) arbitration in favour of advice (Equation 19);
(iii) informational uncertainty (Equation 25) and volatility of the advice (Equation 26) and (iv) informational uncertainty and volatility of the card (same
Equations 25 and 26, but for the card modality). (a) and (b) show group averages (see Materials and methods for the exact equations). For the model-
based parameters, the line plots were generated by averaging the computational trajectories of the winning (Arbitrated 3-HGF: Figure 2) model across
all participants for each of the 160 trials. The shaded areas depict +/- standard error of this mean over participants. (c) Group means, standard
deviations and prior values for the response model parameters determining the impact of those trajectories (i.e. uncertainties and arbitration) on trial-
wise wager amount. Jittered raw data are plotted for each parameter. Red lines indicate the mean, grey areas reflect 1 SD from the mean, and the
colored areas the 95% confidence intervals of the mean. The black diamonds denote the prior of the parameters, which in this case is zero. *p<0.05, **p
<0.001. (d) Scatter plots with average actual wager on the x-axis and average of the computational variables assumed to impact the trial-wise wager:
belief uncertainty, arbitration in favor of advice, and volatility of advice on the y-axes, respectively. The correlation coefficients (with corresponding p
Figure 5 continued on next page
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the midbrain [ 6,–18, 12] (Figure 7a). The BOLD signal change in these regions peaked during the
time window of the wager decision. In summary, primarily dorsal regions of PFC were modulated by
arbitration in favor of individually estimated card probability.
Conversely, activity in the right amygdala, VLPFC, orbitofrontal and ventromedial PFC was modu-
lated by arbitration in favor of the advisor’s suggestions (Figure 7b). Outside PFC, the right anterior
TPJ [56, -52, 24], right superior temporal gyrus [52, -18, -8], and right precuneus [6, -51, 32] showed
similar effects (Tables 4 and 5 for the entire list of brain regions). Thus, primarily ventral regions of
PFC together with temporal and parietal regions were more active during arbitration in favor of
social information.
To examine effects of arbitration in dopaminergic, cholinergic, and noradrenergic regions, we
also performed region-of-interest (ROI) analyses using a combined anatomical mask of dopaminer-
gic, cholinergic, and noradrenergic nuclei. A single cluster in the right substantia nigra survived
small-volume correction (p<0.05 FWE voxel-level corrected for the entire ROI; peak at [ 6,–18,
Figure 5 continued
values), regression slopes, and effect sizes (Cohen’s f ) are included to quantify the relationship between the actual wager and the computational
quantities that showed a significant relation to wagers.
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 5:
Figure supplement 1. Model validity with regard to wager amount.
Figure 6. Whole-brain undirected arbitration signals. Effects of arbitration in favor of one or the other source of information were detected in
ventromedial PFC, orbitofrontal cortex, right frontopolar cortex, VLPFC, the left midbrain, bilateral fusiform gyrus, lateral occipital gyrus, lingual gyrus,
anterior insula, right amygdala, left thalamus, right cerebellum, bilateral middle cingulate sulcus and SMA. The figure shows whole-brain FWE-corrected
voxel (red) - and cluster-level-corrected (yellow) results of an undirected F-test, p<0.05 (CDT = cluster defining voxel-level threshold).
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 6:
Figure supplement 1. Main effects of precision-weighted PEs about card and advice outcomes (Equations 8 and 14).
Figure supplement 2. Main effects of precision-weighted PEs about card and advice volatility.
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 12]; Figure 8). Activity in this region increased with arbitration in favor of individual estimates of
card probabilities rather than advice.
It is important to note that these regions showed significantly larger effects of arbitration than of
the amount of points wagered. Responses reflecting arbitration dominated over responses reflecting
wager amount in cerebellar, midbrain, occipital, parietal, medial prefrontal, and temporal regions
including the amygdala. Activity in precuneus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex in turn correlated
with wager amount (Figure 9). As wager amount can be taken as a proxy for decision value or confi-
dence (Lebreton et al., 2015), these data suggest that arbitration signals arise on top of decision
value and confidence. Moreover, we captured arbitration as a model-derived, continuous, and time-
resolved variable. Thus, our findings elucidate the process rather than the result of arbitration.
Main effect of stability and interaction with source of information
To examine arbitration from a different angle, we also conducted a factorial analysis. This was possi-
ble because we employed a 2  2 factorial design – that is, two sources of information (individual
versus social) in two different states (stable versus volatile) (Figure 10a). Specifically, we contrasted
volatile with stable phases across both information modalities. Volatility is closely tied to arbitration
because it potentiates the perceived uncertainty associated with a given information source, and
thereby the need to arbitrate. We assumed that arbitration increased when one of the two informa-
tion sources was perceived as being more stable than the other. In all comparisons, we controlled
for decision value and confidence by using the trial-wise wager amount as a parametric modulator in
the analysis of brain data. We found two significant results (Figure 10b): (i) a main effect of task
Table 3. MNI coordinates and F-statistic of maxima of activations induced by either form of arbitration (Equations 19-20; p<0.05,
cluster-level whole-brain FWE corrected).
Related to Figure 7.
Hemisphere X Y Z # Voxels F-statistic
 kð Þ
Midbrain L -6  18  12 20 23.49
Thalamus L  12  18 8 490 59.87
Anterior insula L  44 2 0 1744 52.97
Anterior insula R 48 6 -2 813 31.56
Fusiform gyrus R 28  78  10 1327 75.32
Fusiform gyrus L  28  76  10 227 39.55
Inferior occipital gyrus R 48  68  10 810 52.70
Inferior occipital gyrus L  42  68 -4 1519 67.56
Calcarine sulcus R 12  86 6 22285 199.99
Superior temporal gyrus L  60  30 -2 79 24.02
Superior temporal sulcus R 52  18 -8 104 30.35
Amygdala R 18  10  16 76 27.01
Precuneus R 4  52 30 238 38.50
Dorsal medial PFC L  10 44 52 108 23.14
Superior medial PFC R 4 56 28 493 39.83
Ventrolateral PFC R 50 36 0 202 24.28
Frontopolar cortex R 4 54 30 138 24.28
Orbitofrontal cortex R 26 34  10 80 30.47
Ventromedial PFC L -2 46  10 393 37.43
Supramarginal gyrus R 54  30 50 46.46 952
Cerebellum R 18  48  18 1919 166.69
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phase (i.e. stability/volatility), and (ii) a significant interaction of task phase with source of
information.
By contrasting stable against volatile phases, irrespective of information source, we found that
the right supramarginal gyrus, bilateral inferior occipital gyri, postcentral/precentral gyri, and the
right anterior insula were more active for stable compared to volatile periods. Furthermore, an inter-
action between task phase and information source showed preferential activity for stable card infor-
mation in the midbrain [ 4,–22,  8]. Additional activations were detected in the right OFC, VLPFC,
dorsomedial cingulate gyrus, and anterior cingulate sulcus/SMA (Figure 10; Table 6 and Table 7).
These regions processed stability (vs. volatility) more strongly for card than advice information.
Importantly, the regions processing stability (vs. volatility) more strongly for advice than card
information also overlapped with the arbitration signal, and included the amygdala, the superior
temporal sulcus, and the ventromedial PFC (Figure 11). Thus, model-dependent and model-inde-
pendent analyses agree in localizing arbitration to frontoparietal regions in the individual domain
and to ventromedial prefrontal and amygdala regions in the social domain.
Figure 7. Neural arbitration directed to specific source of information. (a) Activity in the left midbrain (substantia nigra (SN)) [ 6,–18,  10] (top) and the
right DLPFC [36, 46, 30] (bottom) during the prediction of card color increased more when participants arbitrated in favor of individually estimated card
color probability as compared to the advisor’s suggestions (whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected, p<0.05). (b) Activity in right (OFC [28, 26, -16] (top)
and in right amygdala [18, -10, -16] (bottom) increased more when participants arbitrated in favor of the advisor’s suggestion than when they arbitrated
in favor of the individually learned estimates of card probability (whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected, p<0.05). The line plots reflect the average
BOLD signal activity in the respective significantly activated cluster aligned to the onset of advice presentation relative to pre-advice baseline averaged
across trials for one representative participant in midbrain and DLPFC (a) or OFC and amygdala (b). The shaded areas depict + / - standard error of this
mean. In this figure, the scales reflect t-values.
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 7:
Figure supplement 1. Social versus non-social weighting (Equation 21).
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Are there neural differences in the representation of social versus non-
social information?
To address the question of distinct representation of social compared to non-social signatures of
learning, we investigated precision-weighted predictions of social and non-social outcomes. The pre-
cision-weighted predictions consist of the two factors that enter the computation of integrated
beliefs (Equation 21) about the outcome. The first reflects the individual card color estimates
weighted by arbitration in favor of the individually sampled card probabilities (non-social weighting),
whereas the second reflects the predictions of advice accuracy weighted by arbitration in favor of
the advisor (social weighting). Increased effects of non-social compared to social weighting were
detected in bilateral cerebellum, occipital cortices (lingual gyrus, superior occipital cortex), left
Table 4. MNI coordinates and t-statistic of maxima of activations induced by arbitration for the individually estimated card reward
probability (Equation 20; p<0.05, cluster-level whole-brain corrected).
Related to Figure 8a.
Hemisphere X Y Z # Voxels t-statistic
 kð Þc : Positive correlations
Midbrain L -6  18  10 95 4.94
Thalamus L  16  18 8 232 5.10
R 22  30 4 206 5.10
Anterior insula L  44 2 0 2232 7.28
R 36 16 8 943 6.23
Supplementary motor area/anterior cingulate sulcus L -2 -8 52 1688 6.29
Dorsolateral PFC R 36 46 30 136 5.93
Middle occipital gyrus R 12  86 6 237 11.70
L  32  82 16 136 8.26
Superior occipital gyrus R 28  78 30 343 11.00
L  26  82 32 143 8.73
Cerebellum R 18  48  18 21557 12.91
Table 5. MNI coordinates and t-statistic of maxima of activations induced by arbitration for the social advice (Equation 19; p<0.05,
cluster-level whole-brain FWE corrected).
Related to Figure 8b.
Hemisphere X Y Z # Voxels t -statistic
 kð Þa : Positive correlations
Precuneus R 6  51 32 284 6.25
Amygdala R 18  10  16 107 5.20
Anterior cingulate cortex L -2 44  10 136 4.82
Ventromedial PFC R 8 52 14 231 5.72
Ventrolateral PFC R 50 36 0 305 4.93
Frontopolar cortex R 4 62 22 153 4.59
Orbitofrontal cortex R 28 26  16 126 5.11
Middle frontal gyrus R 38 14 28 305 5.36
Superior temporal gyrus L  60  30 -2 107 4.90
Superior temporal sulcus R 52  18 -8 152 5.51
Anterior temporoparietal junction R 56  52 24 173 4.18
Cerebellum L  24  84  34 121 4.11
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anterior cingulate sulcus, right supramarginal gyrus, and left postcentral gyrus. Conversely, we found
increased representations of social compared to non-social weighting in the left subgenual ACC with
a maximum at [ 7, 36,–11] (Figure 7—figure supplement 1).
Replication of hierarchical precision-weighted PE effects across learning
domains
To test whether the task used in this study replicates previous findings on the representation of hier-
archical precision-weighted PEs (Diaconescu et al., 2017; Iglesias et al., 2013), we performed the
same model-based analysis using Bayesian surprise (equivalent to an unsigned precision-weighted
Figure 8. Arbitration signals in neuromodulatory ROI. Activation of the dopaminergic midbrain was associated with arbitrating in favor of individually
learned information. Activation (red) is shown at p<0.05 FWE corrected for the full anatomical ROI comprising dopaminergic, cholinergic, and
noradrenergic nuclei (yellow).
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 8:
Figure supplement 1. Neuromodulatory nuclei anatomical mask.
Figure 9. Arbitration vs. Wager Amount. Effects of arbitration (individual) (blue) were significantly larger in cortical
and subcortical brain regions when compared to wager amount. Effects of arbitration in favor of social information
were also significantly larger in ventromedial PFC and amygdala when compared to wager amount (green).
Activity in precuneus and ventromedial PFC regions increased with increases in wager amount (magenta) (whole-
brain FWE cluster-level corrected, p<0.05).
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outcome PE; the absolute value of Equation 14). Replicating the previous study (Iglesias et al.,
2013), we found that the outcome-related BOLD activity of the substantia nigra positively correlated
with the unsigned precision-weighted outcome PE, as did the bilateral inferior/middle occipital gyri,
anterior insula, (ventro)lateral PFC, and the intraparietal sulcus (Figure 6—figure supplement 1a
and Supplementary file 1A). In the previous study, participants predicted a visual outcome using an
auditory cue (Iglesias et al., 2013). Thus, the PE coding of these regions seems to be sensory
modality-independent.
With respect to the signed precision-weighted advice PE (Equation 8), we also replicated results
from another recent study (Diaconescu et al., 2017) that employed a different advice-taking para-
digm, where participants learned about advice and integrated it along with unambiguous individual
information to predict the outcome of a binary lottery. Effects of signed precision-weighted advice
PE were detected in right VTA/substantia nigra, the right insula, left middle temporal cortex, right
dorsolateral, left dorsomedial and middle frontal cortex (Figure 6—figure supplement 1b and
Supplementary file 1B).
Please note that we used the unsigned (absolute) precision-weighted PEs for the card outcomes,
but the signed precision-weighted PEs for the advice. In the case of the card, the sign of this PE
depends on an arbitrarily chosen coding of the color and the sign is meaningless (see Iglesias et al.,
Figure 10. Activations related to task phase and interaction with source of information. (a) The task mapped onto a factorial structure with four
conditions: (i) stable card and stable advisor, (ii) stable card and volatile advisor, (iii) volatile card and stable advisor, and (iv) volatile card and volatile
advisor, as reflected by the shaded areas: blue (stable), grey (volatile). (b) The main effect of stability irrespective of source of information activated
primarily parietal regions and the anterior insula (cyan, whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected, p<0.05). Moreover, the interaction between task phase
and source of information was localized to left midbrain, occipital regions, anterior insula, thalamus, middle cingulate sulcus, SMA, OFC, and VLPFC
(magenta, whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected, p<0.05).
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2013). In contrast, for the advice, the sign refers to the valence and instances of surprise where the
advisor was more helpful than predicted, and may have a different meaning than instances of sur-
prise where the advisor was more misleading than predicted (see Diaconescu et al., 2017). For com-
pleteness, we also investigated the neural correlates of the signed reward precision-weighted PE
and noted a similar network of posterior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal regions.
Effects of precision-weighted volatility PEs for card outcomes were represented in the right supe-
rior temporal gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, and posterior insula (Figure 6—figure supplement 2a)
while the effects of precision-weighted volatility PEs for the adviser fidelity were encoded in the right
anterior supplementary motor area (SMA) and anterior insula.
Table 6. MNI coordinates and F-statistic for main effects of stability (p<0.05, FWE whole-brain corrected).
Related to Figure 11 (activations in cyan).
Hemisphere X Y Z # Voxels F-statistic
Stability > Volatility
Supramarginal gyrus R 46  28 42 1199 38.16
Inferior occipital gyrus R 46  66 0 580 33.99
L  46  70 4 256 20.82
Anterior insula R 34 20 2 98 29.30
Postcentral gyrus L  52 2 34 107 28.97
R 54  22 34 129 5.59
Precentral gyrus L  60  20 32 512 40.21
R 50 4 32 129 20.58
Middle frontal gyrus L  26 0 58 117 20.18
Table 7. MNI coordinates and F-statistic for interactions between task phases and stimulus type (p<0.05, FWE whole-brain
corrected).
Related to Figure 11 (activations in magenta).
Hemisphere X Y Z # Voxels F-statistic
Information Source  Task Phase
Midbrain L -4  22 -8 154 48.03
Thalamus L  12  24 0 189 116.73
R 16  30 2 154 104.27
Middle cingulate gyrus L  10 16 32 94 37.10
Anterior insula L  34 -2 10 88 26.71
Supplementary motor area/anterior cingulate sulcus L -6 -2 56 736 104.45
Dorsolateral PFC L  38 52 8 133 22.96
R 34 34 34 94 21.02
Inferior occipital gyrus R 44  66 6 3600 190.83
L  40  76  12 3300 162.67
Superior occipital gyrus R 28  78 30 80 23.54
L  26  82 32 81 28.64
Orbitofrontal cortex L 0 48  22 189 100.84
R 2 40  24 180 34.66
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L  46 48  12 81 37.69
R 50 44 -8 80 23.53
Cerebellum R 30  86  42 95 25.15
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Finally, we also replicated the finding that higher-level, volatility PEs (Equations 13 and 15) were
represented in cholinergic regions. This time, however, we observed effects of advice volatility preci-
sion-weighted PEs in the cholinergic nuclei in the tegmentum of the brainstem, that is, the peduncu-
lopontine tegmental (PPT) and laterodorsal tegmental (LDT) nuclei (p<0.05 FWE voxel-level within
an anatomical mask including all cholinergic nuclei) (Figure 6—figure supplement 2b).
Discussion
Our study shows how healthy participants arbitrate between uncertain social and individual informa-
tion under varying conditions of stability during a binary lottery task. (Figure 1). Participants arbi-
trated between the two information sources by taking into account their relative precision. The more
precise one information source was over the other and the more stable the advisor was perceived to
be, the more points participants were willing to wager.
By showing that participants tracked the volatility of both the advice and the card color probabili-
ties (Figure 3), our study underscores the importance of volatility in arbitrating between social
advice and individual reward-relevant information. At the behavioral level, trial-by-trial accuracy of
participant predictions, frequency of taking advice into account, and amount of points wagered on
each trial (Figure 5—figure supplement 1) were all reduced by volatility. Thus, in stable compared
to volatile environments, the propensity for arbitration in favor of the more precise information
Figure 11. Overlap between model-dependent and model-independent results. Arbitration signal (Equation 19) (yellow) overlapped with the regions
showing an enhanced effect of stability for individual compared to social learning systems (blue) and regions showing enhanced effects of stability in
the social compared to individual learning systems (red) (whole-brain FWE peak-level corrected, p<0.05).
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source increases. Numerous studies have demonstrated an important role of volatility in higher level
learning (Behrens et al., 2007; Behrens et al., 2008; Nassar et al., 2010; Iglesias et al., 2013;
Vossel et al., 2014; Diaconescu et al., 2017; Pulcu and Browning, 2017), in-keeping with the pres-
ent findings.
Evidence for domain-generality of arbitration in lateral prefrontal
cortex
Using both model-based and model-independent (factorial) fMRI analysis, we found that the arbitra-
tion signal correlated with activity in dorsolateral and ventrolateral PFC, frontopolar, and orbitofron-
tal cortex (Figures 6 and 11). These findings corroborate previous insights on arbitration between
different forms of individual information also pointing to lateral prefrontal cortex (Lee et al., 2014),
in line with domain generality for arbitrating. Note though that arbitration activity in the prefrontal
cortex followed a self-versus-other axis: dorsal prefrontal activity increased the more strongly partici-
pants weighed their own predictions of reward probabilities over the perceived reliability of the
advisor. Conversely, activity in the ventromedial PFC and orbitofrontal cortex showed the opposite
pattern and increased in activity as participants relied more heavily on their own reward probability
estimates relative to the advice (Figure 7). Together, arbitration appears to be sensitive to the
source of information entering the arbitration process, contrary to an entirely domain-general
process.
Arbitration in the dopaminergic system
The results of both model-based and factorial analyses suggest a key role of the midbrain in arbitrat-
ing for individual estimates about card color over advice (Figure 8). Primate studies found that sus-
tained dopamine neuron activity signaled expected uncertainty (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Schultz, 2010;
Schultz et al., 2008). This was further supported by human pharmacological studies (Burke et al.,
2018; Ojala et al., 2018) as well as fMRI research showing possible involvement of dopamine in risk
taking and of dopaminoceptive regions, such as the caudate, anterior insula, ACC and the medial
PFC in uncertainty coding (e.g. Dreher et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Tobler et al.,
2009) and social advice predictions under uncertainty (Henco et al., 2020). In particular, studies
employing hierarchical Bayesian models have identified ventral tegmental area/substantia nigra acti-
vation correlated to precision of predictions about desired outcomes (Friston et al., 2014;
Schwartenbeck et al., 2015).
These findings may also underscore the role of dopamine in modulating participants’ ability to
optimize learning to suit ongoing estimates of environmental volatility. Potential neurobiological
mechanisms include meta-learning models, which propose an important role of phasic dopamine sig-
nals in training prefrontal system dynamics, to infer on the statistical structure of the environment
(Collins and Frank, 2016; Wang et al., 2018). Such models imply that improved learning of the
structure of the environment, for example current levels of volatility, results in more appropriate arbi-
tration adjustment.
Arbitrating in favor of the advisor activates the amygdala and
orbitofrontal cortex
The amygdala processed perceived reliability of social information, reflected in activity increasing
the more participants discounted their own estimates of rewarded card color probabilities in favour
of the advisor’s recommendations. The amygdala has been implicated in processing facial expres-
sions related to affective ToM (Schmitgen et al., 2016) and more generally, processing affective
value and motivational significance of various stimuli, including other people (Güroğlu et al., 2008;
Zink et al., 2008; Zerubavel et al., 2015). Together these findings suggest that the amygdala may
represent the uncertainty of socially-relevant stimuli, inferred from processing the intentions of
others.
Similar to the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex showed a significant interaction between task
phase and information source, indicative of arbitrating in favor of social information. This finding is
consistent with the hypothesis that the orbitofrontal cortex and other areas of the social brain
evolved to enable primates and particularly humans to successfully navigate complex social situa-
tions (Dunbar, 2009). This notion received support from strong positive correlations between
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orbitofrontal cortex grey matter volume and social network size (Powell et al., 2012), as well as soci-
ocognitive abilities (Powell et al., 2010; Scheuerecker et al., 2010). Furthermore, in-keeping with a
role of orbitofrontal cortex in mental state attribution for ambiguous social stimuli (Deuse et al.,
2016), our findings suggest that this region reduces the uncertainty of social cues that signal
changes in intentionality.
With respect to social learning signatures, we observed that the sulcus of the ACC represents
predictions related to one’s own estimates of the card color outcomes, whereas the subgenual ACC
represents predictions about the advisor’s fidelity. This is consistent with previous findings that the
sulcus of ACC dorsal to the gyrus plays a domain-general role in motivation (Rushworth et al.,
2007; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Apps et al., 2016), whereas the gyrus of the ACC signals
information related to other people (Behrens et al., 2008; Apps et al., 2013; Apps et al., 2016;
Lockwood, 2016).
Implications for mentalizing disorders
An intriguing extension of the current study concerns the question of whether arbitration occurs dif-
ferently in patients with psychiatric and neurodevelopmental disorders involving ToM processes. If
so, how do these processing differences affect behavior? For example, individuals with autism spec-
trum disorder may preferentially rely on their own experiences rather than on the recommendations
of others. Indeed, they appear to represent social prediction errors less strongly than individuals
without autism (Balsters et al., 2017). Accordingly, they may be able to better infer the volatility of
the card color probability compared to the advice in our task. In contrast, patients with schizophre-
nia may be overly confident about their ability to judge advice validity due to fixed beliefs about the
advisor’s intentions (Freeman and Garety, 2014) or show an over-reliance on social information in
line with accounts of over-mentalization in this disorder (Montag et al., 2011; Andreou et al.,
2015). Future work may test these intriguing possibilities.
Limitations
One limitation of our study is that it did not include reciprocal social interactions, but rather used
pre-recorded videos of human partners. ToM processes may be more prominent in interactive para-
digms (Diaconescu et al., 2014) or interactions that involve higher levels of recursive thinking
(Devaine et al., 2014a; Devaine et al., 2014b). By extension, our study may have limited generaliz-
ability to real-world social interactions. However, assessing arbitration between social and individual
information necessitated the standardization of the advice given to each participant. To make the
task as close as possible to a realistic social exchange, the videos of the advisor were extracted from
trials when they truly intended to help or truly intended to mislead. More importantly, to adequately
compare learning from social and individual information in stable and volatile phases, we needed to
ensure that the two information types were orthogonal to each other and balanced in terms of
volatility.
Second, we did not include a non-social control task. Thus, it is unclear how ‘social’ the presently
investigated form of learning about the advisor’s fidelity and volatility actually is. The differences in
activated regions at least suggest that our participants processed the two sources of information dif-
ferently. However, whether the process we identified is specifically social in nature or rather reflects
learning from an indirect information source needs to be examined in future studies by including an
additional control condition.
In order to distinguish general inference processes under volatility from inference specific to
intentionality, we previously included a control task (Diaconescu et al., 2014), in which the advisor
was blindfolded and provided advice with cards from predefined decks that were probabilistically
congruent to the actual card color. This control task closely resembled the main task, with the excep-
tion of the role of intentionality. Model selection results suggested that participants in the control
task did not incorporate time-varying estimates of volatility about the advisor into their decisions. In
the current study, we tested this by including models without volatility, but found that they per-
formed substantially worse than models with volatility (see Figure 2 and Table 2a for details). Thus,
our participants appeared to process advisor intentionality.
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Conclusions
Our study indicates that arbitrating between social and individual sources of information corre-
sponds to weighing the relative reliability of each source. This process appears to engage different
brain regions for social and individual information, in-keeping with domain specificity. However, the
lateral prefrontal cortex appears to adjudicate between several different types of learning, in-keep-
ing with domain generality. These findings contribute to our understanding of arbitration in neuro-




We recruited 48 volunteers (mean age 23.6 ± 1.4, 32 females) who were non-smokers, right-handed,
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants had no history of neurological or psychi-
atric illness, or of drug abuse. Psychology students were excluded from participation because of pre-
vious exposure to similar advice-taking paradigms in their courses. Participants were asked to
abstain from alcohol 24 hr prior to the study and from medication, including aspirin, 3 days prior to
the study. We did not analyse the data of 10 participants: two pilot participants; one participant who
stopped the experiment midway due to head pain; one participant who fell asleep; and six partici-
pants where stimulus presentation malfunctioned during the experiment. Altogether, 38 participants
(mean age 24.2 ± 1.3; 26 females) entered the final analysis.
Stimuli and task
We modified the deception-free binary lottery game of Diaconescu et al., 2014. In each trial, the
participant had to predict the color of a card draw – blue or green. Participants could base their pre-
dictions on social information and/or on individually experienced recent outcome history (see below).
They received social information from the ‘advisor’, who held up a card in one of the two colors
before every draw, recommending to the participant which option to choose. The advisor based his
or her suggestion on information that was true with a probability of 80%, although the participants
were not informed of this fact. Furthermore, the advisor received monetary incentives to change his
or her strategy and thus provide either helpful or misleading advice at different stages of the game
(Figure 1b) with the average probability of advice being correct in 56% of trials. To compare partici-
pants in terms of their learning and decision-making parameters, we needed to standardize the
advice. This means that each participant received the same input sequence,that is order and type of
videos.
To display social information in a standardized fashion and gender-match advisors and partici-
pants, we created videos from two male and two female advisors, who changed their advice as a
function of the incentives in a previously recorded face-to-face session (see Diaconescu et al.,
2014). Their advice on each trial was recorded for an entire experimental session and the full-length
videos were edited into 2 s segments, focusing on the advice period. We received informed consent
from all advisors in the initial (face-to-face) behavioral study to record and use the advice-giving vid-
eos in subsequent studies. All video clips were matched in terms of their luminance, contrast, and
color balance using Adobe Photoshop Premiere CS6.
To standardize the advice, avoid implicit cues of deception, and make the task as close as possi-
ble to a social exchange in real time, the videos of the advisor were extracted from trials when they
truly intended to help or truly intended to mislead. Although each participant received the same
advice sequence throughout the task, the advisors displayed in the videos varied between partici-
pants, in order to ensure that physical appearance and gender did not impact on their decisions to
take advice into account. Advisor-to-participant assignment was randomized (within the gender-
matching constraint) and balanced. We found no differences in performance and degree of reliance
on advice between the four advisors: F(1,36) = 1.82, p=0.16.
In contrast to previous studies (Diaconescu et al., 2014; Diaconescu et al., 2017), participants
had to infer card color probabilities (blue versus green) from individually experienced outcomes of
previous trials rather than being provided with (changing) pie charts explicitly stating the probabili-
ties. In each trial, they had to arbitrate between following either social information (previous advice,
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inferring on intention) or individual information (previous cards, inferring on probability). Moreover,
also in contrast to previous studies, for each lottery prediction, participants wagered between one
and ten points to indicate how confident they were about their predictions. The tick mark on the
wager bar was randomly positioned in each trial to avoid providing a reference point (a regression
analysis confirmed that the starting position of the wager indeed failed to explain each participant’s
trial-wise wager selection, t(37) =  0.89, p=0.31). Depending on the correctness of the prediction,
the wager was added to or subtracted from the cumulative score and thereby affected the partici-
pant’s payment at the end of the experiment (see below).
Each trial (Figure 1a) began with a video of the advisor holding up a card, followed by a decision
screen in which participants selected the blue or green card. At the next screen, they were asked to
provide the wager. The subsequent outcome screen revealed the drawn card. Finally, the updated
cumulative score appeared. The color-to-button assignment used to convey the lottery prediction
(blue or green) and the orientation of the wager bar were randomized between participants to pre-
vent confounding with visuomotor processes.
Across trials, the color-reward probabilities and the advisor intentions varied independently of
each other. In other words, the probability distributions of the two information sources – card color
and advice – were designed to be statistically independent. This allowed for a 2  2 factorial design
structure, where trials could be divided into four conditions: (i) stable card and stable advisor, (ii) sta-
ble card and volatile advisor, (iii) volatile card and stable advisor, and (iv) volatile card and volatile
advisor in a total of 160 trials (Figure 1b). Based on this factorial structure, we predicted that arbitra-
tion signals would vary as a function of the stability of each information source.
Procedure
We explained the deception-free task to participants and ensured their comprehension with a writ-
ten questionnaire, which required them to describe the instructions in their own words. The task
instructions, which were originally presented to participants in their native German, were translated
into English for the purpose of this paper. Pronouns were adapted to the advisor’s gender: "The
advisor has generally more information than you about the outcome on each trial. The objective of
the advisor is to use this information to guide your choices and reach his/her own goals. Note that
the advisor does not have 100% accurate information about which color ‘wins’ and he/she might be
incorrect. Nevertheless, he/she will on average have better information than you and his/her advice
may be valuable to you." The actual experiment was divided into two sessions, with a 2-min break in
the middle when participants could close their eyes and rest. The first session included 70 trials and
the second session 90 trials.
To test the construct validity of our computational model and verify whether participants inferred
on the advisor’s fidelity, we asked them to rate the usefulness of the advisor’s card recommendation
based on a multiple choice question (including, ‘helpful,’ ‘misleading,’ or ‘neutral’). This question
was presented six times throughout the task and responses allowed us to assess whether at any
point in time, the model could significantly predict participants’ responses.
Participants could earn a bonus of 10 Swiss Francs for a cumulative score of at least 380 points,
and a bonus of 20 Swiss Francs for winning more than 600 points. Importantly, participants were not
given any information about the bonus thresholds in order to prevent induction of local risk-seeking
or risk-averse wagering behavior (reference point effects) when participants were close to a thresh-
old. Participants on average reached the first reward bonus and were paid 82.3 ± 8.4 Swiss Francs
(including the performance-dependent bonus) at the end of the study. After the task, participants
completed a debriefing questionnaire, and we revealed to them the general trajectory of the advi-
sor’s intentions.
Data acquisition and preprocessing
We acquired functional magnetic resonance images (fMRI) from a Philips Achieva 3T whole-body
scanner with an 8-channel SENSE head coil (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) at the
Laboratory for Social Neural Systems Research at the University Hospital Zurich. The task was pre-
sented on a display at the back of the scanner, which participants viewed using a mirror placed on
top of the head coil. The first five volumes of each session were discarded to allow for magnetic
saturation.
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During the task, we acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) data with
blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) contrast (slices/volume = 33; TR = 2665 ms; voxel
volume = 22 x 3 mm3; interslice gap = 0.6 mm; field of view (FOV) = 192192 x 120 mm; echo
time (TE) = 35 ms; flip angle = 90˚). The images were oblique, slices with  20˚ right-left angulation
from a transverse orientation. The entire experiment comprised 1300 volumes, with 600 volumes in
the first session and 700 in the second. Heart rate and breathing of the participants were recorded
for physiological noise correction purposes using ECG and a pneumatic belt, respectively.
We also measured the homogeneity of the magnetic field with a T1-weighted 3-dimensional (3-D)
fast gradient echo sequence (FOV = 192192 x 135 mm3; voxel volume = 22 x 3 mm3; flip
angle = 6˚; TR = 8.3 ms; TE1 = 2 ms; TE2 = 4.3 ms). After the experiment, we acquired T1-weighted
structural scans from each participant using an inversion-recovery sagittal 3-D fast gradient echo
sequence (FOV = 256256 x 181 mm3; voxel volume = 11 x 1 mm3; TR = 8.3 ms; TE = 3.9 ms; flip
angle = 8˚).
The software package SPM12 version 6470 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London,
UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was used to analyse the fMRI data. Temporal and spatial pre-
processing included slice-timing correction, realignment to the mean image, and co-registration to
the participant’s own structural scan. The structural image underwent a unified segmentation proce-
dure combining segmentation, bias correction, and spatial normalization (Ashburner and Friston,
2005); the same normalization parameters were then applied to the EPI images. As a final step, EPI
images were smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width half-maximum.
BOLD signal fluctuations due to physiological noise were modeled with the PhysIO toolbox
(http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas) (Kasper et al., 2017) using Fourier expansions
of different order for the estimated phases of cardiac pulsation (3rd order), respiration (4th order)
and cardio-respiratory interactions (1st order; Glover et al., 2000). The 18 modeled physiological
regressors entering the subject-level GLM along with the six rigid-body realignment parameters and
regressors of interest were used to account for BOLD signal fluctuations induced by cardiac pulsa-
tion, respiration, and the interaction between the two.
Computational modeling
We formalized arbitration in terms of hierarchical Bayesian inference as the relative perceived reli-
ability of each information source. In other words, arbitration was defined as a ratio of precisions:
the precision of the prediction about advice accuracy and color probability, divided by the total pre-
cision. The precisions of the predictions afforded by each learning system are obtained by applying
a two-branch hierarchical Gaussian filter (Mathys et al., 2011; Mathys et al., 2014) along with a
response model (see below) to participants’ trial–wise behavior (i.e. choices and wagers).
Learning model: Hierarchical Gaussian Filter
The HGF is a model of hierarchical Bayesian inference widely used for computational analyses of
behavior (e.g. [Iglesias et al., 2013; Vossel et al., 2014; Hauser et al., 2014; de Berker et al.,
2016; Marshall et al., 2016]). To apply it to our task, we assumed that the rewarded card color (indi-







; . . . ; x kð Þn . They evolved in time by performing Gaussian random walks. At every
level, the step size was controlled by the state of the next-higher level (Figure 2a).
Starting from the bottom of the hierarchy, states x1; a and x1;c represented binary variables,
namely the advice accuracy (1 for accurate, 0 for inaccurate) and the rewarded card color (1 for blue,
0 for green). All states higher than x1 were continuous. They denoted (i) the advisor fidelity and ten-
dency for a given card color to be rewarded, and (ii) the rate of change of the advisor’s intentions
and card color contingencies, respectively. Four learning parameters, namely, ka, kc, #a and
#c determined how quickly the hidden states evolved in time. Parameter k represented the degree
of coupling between the second and the third levels in the hierarchy, whereas # determined the vari-
ability of the volatility over time (meta-volatility). This constitutes the generative model of the pro-
cess producing the outcomes observed by participants. The overall model and the formal equations
describing these relations in a social learning context are detailed in Diaconescu et al., 2014.
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Model inversion: agent-specific arbitration
In accordance with Bayes’ rule, we assumed that participants who make inferences on advice and
card colors form posterior beliefs over the hidden states (i.e. congruency of advice with actual card
color; rewarded card color) based on the outcomes they observe. Model inversion is the application
of Bayes’ rule to a generative model such as the one described above. This leads to a recognition or
perceptual model, which describes participants’ beliefs about hidden states. Assuming Gaussian dis-
tributions, these agent-specific beliefs are denoted by their summary statistics, that is m (mean) and
s (variance/uncertainty) or the inverse of the variance p ¼ 1=s (precision/certainty).
Using variational Bayes under the mean-field approximation, simple analytical trial-by-trial update
equations can be derived. The posterior means 
kð Þ
i or predictions on each trial k at each level of the













Throughout, predictions or prior beliefs about the hidden states (before observing the outcome)




i represent the estimated precisions about (i) the
input from the level below (i.e. precision of the data – advice congruency or rewarded card color)
and (ii) the belief at the current level, respectively.


















Variable u kð Þ is the sensory input at trial k, where given advice is either accurate uðkÞ ¼ 1
  
or inac-





























with the predicted (i) belief precision p̂
ðkÞ
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and (ii) the predicted volatility, 
k 1ð Þ
3;a from the level above via Equation 6.
The precision-weighted PE about the advice, which is used to update the belief about fidelity is
equivalent to:
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The same form of update equations (and precision-weighted PEs) can be derived for the individ-














































for the card volatility PE. The individually estimated card color probability is equivalent to the logistic
sigmoid of the current expectation of the rewarding card color:
̂
kð Þ









  : (18)
In this context, Bayes-optimality is individualized with respect to the values of the learning param-
eters, which were allowed to differ across participants.
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Arbitration signal
Within this computational framework, we defined arbitration as the relative perceived precision asso-
ciated with each information source, which is equivalent to the precision of the prediction of each
information channel (advice or card; i.e. p̂) divided by the total precision. Arbitration is consistent
with Bayes’ rule representing the optimal integration of the two inferred states by their precisions.














on each trial k at each level of the hierarchy i with z as the social bias or the additional bias towards
the advice.
At the first level and at i ¼ 1, the participant relies preferentially on the social input during action
selection when 
kð Þ
1;a exceeds 0.5. Conversely, when 
kð Þ
1;a is below 0.5 , the participant relies more on
















To map beliefs to decisions, we assumed that the prediction of card color on a given trial k is a func-
tion of arbitration and of the predictions afforded by each source (see Equation 21). The response
model predicts two components of the behavioral response: (i) the participant’s decision to accept
or reject the advice and (ii) the number of points wagered on every trial. Responses were coded as
y ¼ 1 when participants took the advice and chose the card color indicated by the advisor, and y ¼ 0
when participants decided against following the advice and chose the opposite card color. The
expected outcome probability is thus a precision-weighted sum of the two information sources, the
















1;c are the arbitration for each information source; ̂
kð Þ
1;a is the expected advice accu-
racy (Equation 4) and 
kð Þ
1;c is the transformed expected card color probability from the perspective
of the advice (i.e. the estimated card color probability indicated by the advisor).
It follows from Equation 21, that social weighting is represented by the first term of this inte-










The probability that participants chose a particular card color according to their expectations


















where bchoice>0 is the participant-specific inverse decision temperature parameter. A low decision
temperature (high bchoice) means always choosing the highest probability color, whereas a high deci-
sion temperature (low bchoice) means sampling randomly from a uniform distribution.
The number of points wagered provided us with a behavioral readout of decision confidence. We
aimed to formally explain trial-wise wager responses as a linear function of various sources of uncer-
tainty and precision associated with the lottery outcome prediction: (i) irreducible decision uncer-
tainty or ŝ
kð Þ
b about the outcome, (ii) arbitration, (iii) informational uncertainty about the card color or
the advice, and (iv) environmental uncertainty/volatility about the card color or the advice. We trans-
formed these computational quantities down to the first level in the hierarchy using the sigmoid
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transformation and used them to predict the trial-by-trial wager (Figure 5 for the group average of



























Parameter z captures the social bias in arbitration (equation 19) and I
kð Þ
2;a is the informational














2;a is the inverse of p̂
kð Þ
2;a and represents the informational uncertainty of the prediction about
the advisor’s fidelity (Equation 6).














Equivalent equations can be derived for the individual information source.










where bwager is a stochasticity parameter associated with the wager amount. For the priors of all b
parameters estimated here, please refer to Table 2.
Competing models
To contrast competing mechanisms underlying learning and arbitration, our model space consisted
of a total of 9 models (Figure 3). On the one hand, we included non-normative perceptual models
varying in the degree of volatility processing (three-level full HGF vs. two-level no-volatility HGF) and
normative perceptual models assuming optimal Bayesian inference (normative HGF). On the other
hand, we included response models varying in the level of arbitration (arbitration; no arbitration:
advice only; no arbitration: card information only).
We considered three families of perceptual models. The first family included the full, three-level
version of the HGF (as described above). By contrast, the second family lacked the third level, and
assumed that agents do not estimate the volatility of the card probabilities or the advice. Thus, com-
paring families with and without volatility tested whether volatility mattered for arbitrated behavior.
Finally, the third family assumed a Bayes-optimal, normative process of learning from the advice and
card outcomes.
In terms of response models, we also considered three families, capturing different ways in which
participants may arbitrate between social and individual sources of information to make decisions.
These included: (i) an ‘Arbitrated’ model, which assumed that participants combine and arbitrate
between the two information sources, possibly unequally, (ii) an ‘Advice only’ model, assuming arbi-
tration-free reliance on social information only, and (iv) a ‘Card only’ model, representing arbitration-
free reliance on the inferred card color probabilities only (Figure 3a).
All models were compared formally using Bayesian model selection (BMS Stephan et al., 2009).
Random effects BMS results in a posterior probability for each model given the participants’ data.
The relative goodness of models is denoted by the ‘protected exceedance probability’ reflecting
how likely it is that a given model has a higher posterior probability than any other model in the set
of models considered (Stephan et al., 2009; Rigoux et al., 2014).
We adopted a similar set of priors over the perceptual model parameters as in our previous stud-
ies (Diaconescu et al., 2014) (see Table 2). Maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) estimates of model param-
eters were obtained using the HGF toolbox version 3.0, freely available as part of the open source
software package TAPAS at http://www.translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas.
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FMRI data analysis
Single-subject level
Our fMRI data analysis focused on the neural mechanisms of arbitration. Specifically, we conducted
two types of analyses on the pre-processed fMRI data:
First, we performed a model-based fMRI analysis, in which we constructed a general linear model
(GLM), which sought to explain the high-pass filtered voxel time-series with several parametric mod-
ulators. The parametric modulators are listed below and were derived from the winning model (i.e.
arbitrated three-level version of the HGF, which had the highest posterior probability at the group
level). The GLMs were individualized, as the regressors were obtained from fitting the model to the
behavioral data of each of the 38 participants. We individualized GLMs because participants differed
in how much they relied on each information source and in the extent to which volatility influenced
their trial-by-trial wagers (Figures 4–5). To investigate the unique contribution of each parametric
modulator, we did not orthogonalize them (see Figure 1—figure supplement 2 for correlations
between them). Moreover, we also included movement and the physiological noise regressors
obtained from the PhysIO toolbox (Kasper et al., 2017) based on ECG and respiration recordings
as regressors of no interest.
In addition to arbitration at the time of advice presentation, we modeled the wager and the out-
come phases to examine the effects of hierarchical precision-weighted PEs, and thus test the validity
of the computational model and the reproducibility of previous findings, see Figure 6—figure sup-
plements 1–2 (Iglesias et al., 2013; Diaconescu et al., 2017). Specifically, the following regressors
were included in the GLM:
1. Social information – time when the advice was presented (regressor duration two seconds);
2. Arbitration – parametric modulator of (1), using the trial-specific arbitration quantity (Equa-
tion 19-20);
3. Social Weighting – parametric modulator of (1), using the precision-weighted prediction of
the advisor fidelity (first term of Equation 21);
4. Non-social Weighting – parametric modulator of (1), using the precision-weighted predic-
tion of the individual card weighting (second term of Equation 21);
5. Wager presentation – time when the option to wager was presented (regressor duration
zero seconds);
6. Wager - parametric modulator of (3), using the trial-specific amount of points wagered;
7. Outcome – time when the winning card color was presented (regressor duration zero
seconds);
8. Advice Precision-weighted PE – parametric modulator of (5), using the trial-specific preci-
sion-weighted PE of advice validity (Equation 8);
9. Outcome Precision-weighted PE – parametric modulator of (5), using the trial-specific preci-
sion-weighted PE arising from comparing actual and predicted card color (Equation 14).
10. Volatility Advisor Precision-weighted PE – parametric modulator of (5), using the trial-spe-
cific precision-weighted PE of advice volatility (Equation 13);
11. Volatility Card Precision-weighted PE – parametric modulator of (5), using the trial-specific
precision-weighted PE of card color volatility (see Equation 15).
We observed no significant correlations between response times (RTs) and any of the parametric
modulators (|r| < 0.3, p>0.05) and therefore did not model RT explicitly. The lack of effects on RTs
may be due to the temporal structure of our task (Figure 1). Specifically, participants responded
long after having received individual information (card outcome in previous trial) and social informa-
tion had fixed duration (video). Therefore, they are likely to have simply conveyed the decision in the
response phase but made it at some time during the video or even before.
Second, we predicted that arbitration should be sensitive to volatility, and favor one or the other
source of information as a function of perceived relative reliability. Based on this hypothesis, we also
performed a non-model based, factorial analysis by dividing the 160 trials into four conditions corre-
sponding to those factors (Figure 10a). This GLM included for each of the four conditions the time
when the advice was presented (the social information phase) and the trial-wise wager amount as a
parametric modulator. We assumed that the difference between the four conditions will be
expressed in the advice phase, before participants make their predictions.
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Group level
Contrast images from the 38 participants entered a random effects group analysis (Penny and
Holmes, 2007). We used F-tests to identify undirected arbitration signals. Moreover, one-sample
t-tests to investigate directed social or individual arbitration signals and positive or negative BOLD
responses for each of the computational trajectories of interest described above.
Participant gender and age were included as covariates of no interest at the group level (the find-
ings remained the same without these covariates). To investigate individual variability in the repre-
sentation of social arbitration as a function of reliance on advice, we used parameter z to perform a
median split of the group of participants.
For all analyses, we report results that survived whole-brain family-wise error (FWE) correction at
the cluster level at p<0.05, under a cluster-defining threshold of p<0.001 at the voxel level using
Gaussian random field theory (Worsley et al., 1996). Given recent debate regarding the vulnerabil-
ities of cluster-level FWE procedures (Eklund et al., 2016), it is worth emphasising that this cluster-
defining threshold ensures adequate control of cluster-level FWE rates in SPM (Flandin and Friston,
2016). The coordinates of all brain regions were expressed in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
space.
Based on recent results that precisions at different levels of a computational hierarchy may be
encoded by distinct neuromodulatory systems (Payzan-LeNestour et al., 2013;
Schwartenbeck et al., 2015), we also performed ROI analyses based on anatomical masks. We
included (i) the dopaminergic midbrain nuclei substantia nigra (SN) and ventral tegmental area (VTA)
using an anatomical atlas based on magnetization transfer weighted structural MR images
(Bunzeck and Düzel, 2006), (ii) the cholinergic nuclei in the basal forebrain and the tegmentum of
the brainstem using the anatomical toolbox in SPM12 with anatomical landmarks from the literature
(Naidich and Duvernoy, 2009) and (iii) the noradrenergic locus coeruleus based on a probabilistic
map (Keren et al., 2009) (see Figure 8—figure supplement 1 for this neuromodulatory ROI).
Code availability
The routines for all analyses are available as Matlab code: https://github.com/andreeadiaconescu/
arbitration (Kasper and Diaconescu, 2020; copy archived at https://github.com/elifesciences-publi-
cations/arbitration). The instructions for running the code in order to reproduce the results can be
found in the ReadMe file.
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